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Gen Ben Harrison's New Book about The Battle of Ripcord

"Hell On A Hilltop"

HELL ON A HILLTOP

As ten-to-one outnumbered 101st Airborne troopers fought regular NVA units from four hill tops just east of the A Shau Valley for four months in 1970.
 

Book Description
Instead of backing away from the fight, the North Vietnamese mortar, recoilless rifle, heavy machine gun, sapper and regular infantry attacks increased. The last offensive around Ripcord was starting to look like the last stand. Unwilling to keep American soldiers at high risk at this stage of the war; Ripcord was evacuated on 23 July. The battle went unnoticed for 30 years until Keith Nolan’s book, RIPCORD, was published. As powerful and gripping as was the story of great leadership and courageous fighting by our soldiers, the magnitude of the enemy force still remained unknown. The author, the 3rd Brigade commander during the siege and evacuation, made trips to Vietnam in 2001 and 2004 and interviewed the 324B Division Commander whose first-ever division sole mission, was to destroy Firebase Ripcord. The full story is now told.

Please order the book through The Ripcord Association.  All profits will go to the Association.  By buying the books thru the Association, you save money!

Specify how many paperbacks @ $19.95 and how many hardcover @ $29.95 are desired and send the check made out to "Ripcord Association" to:

Lee Widjeskog

493 Stillman Ave

Bridgeton, NJ  08302

For more info, please e-mail Lee Widjeskog

leewidjeskog@ripcordassociation.com

Include your name and address where to ship the books, your phone number and allow 10 days for delivery.

Book Reviews for Hell on A Hilltop

I have just finished reading MG (ret.) Ben Harrison’s book “Hell on a Hill Top”  sub “America’s Last Major Battle in Viet Nam” sub. sub. (The 324B Division surrounds the 101^st Airborne’s Currahee Battalion). For those of you who haven’t read it, you may find it interesting. Two of our classmates are mentioned by name. Bill Bradley was the 3^rd Bde CO for most of the Ripcord Operation. It began in March of 1970 and ended with the evacuation from the hill on 23^rd July 1970. Tom Aaron who was a BN CO is also mentioned. Others with whom you may have served were Andre Lucas “54- a friend of Eddie Partains- 2/506 BN Co who won the Medal of Honor posthumously, General (ret.) John Hennessey and LTG (ret) Sid Berry. During the planning phase of the operation, Harrison stated that Bill had a question about the adequacy of the force planned for the operation, but was told by General Hennessey that the operation would take place as planned. During this period, I was the BN CO of the 2/11 (155s), which had one battery on Ripcord, and for part of the time I was the Acting Division Artillery Commander (Stan Fye “50 replaced me). Prior to the actual occupation of Ripcord, and shortly after the evacuation of Firebase Henderson. Bill was replaced as BDE CO by then Colonel Harrison.

 General Harrison reported that three Congressional Medals of Honor and five Distinguished Service Crosses were earned during the operations. We had 250 KIA including Andre and one of my battery COs. LT Kalsu -the only pro athlete to be killed in Viet Nam. He had been an NFL rookie of the year and could have avoided service in Viet Nam, however he chose to serve in Viet Nam.

After a month of ambushes, attacks, incoming to include artillery, etc. we had a real disaster.  A Chinook helicopter loaded with ammo was shot down on the base. It landed right in the middle of the 105mm battery (2/319 commanded by Bill Walker “52). The impact set off a huge explosion and fire which destroyed the six 105s. Fortunately, my 155s were not damaged. Due to continued intense incoming, increasing causalities and loss of the 105s, Sid Berry (acting Division CO- General Hennessey was on leave), ordered evacuation of the firebase.. All things considered, the evacuation was carried out in good fashion.

                                                                                   Joe Sites

Hell On A Hill Top: America’s Last Major Battle In Vietnam

By Major General Benjamin L. Harrison

iUniverse Press

John M. Del Vecchio

            Over the past quarter century I have been asked to review, comment upon, or edit, literally hundreds of Viet Nam-related books and manuscripts. To my chagrin, for reasons of time or family or sloth, I have only read and respond to about half. My apologies to those authors to whom I did not respond. All that I have read—novels, histories, short stories and poems—have had some merit. Some were superb—well written, enlightening, touching mind, heart and soul. Ben Harrison’s Hell On A Hill Top falls into this category. It is truly an impressive and epic work of historical significance.

­Hill Top--with the inclusion of data and anecdotes from North Viet Namese histories and documents, and Harrison’s first person interviews of PAVN (NVA) commanders--presents the full picture ~ the whats, whys, whos and hows ~ not only of the battle for Firebase Ripcord, but for much more. The book gives us an understanding of the skirmishes, the battle, the supporting units, logistics and politics, all in the perspective of the Cold War era. In doing so, the Commander of the Third Brigade, 101^st Airborne Division (Airmobile), has given meaning to the sacrifices of many.

The Prologue alone is a fascinating tale of how Ben Harrison uncovered the story from the North Viet Namese side. The body of the text explores and exposes the intricate interweaving of various elements, producing amazing revelations: for example, the summer 1970 battles—Ripcord, Barnett, O’Reilly, etc.—were, to the NVA, strikes to pre-empt Lam Son 719 (the Laos Incursion by the ARVN of February 1971). NVA commanders explained to Harrison that they had learned of the plans to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail via intelligence leaks from Saigon in June of 1970. [Harrison is somewhat skeptical of the communist accounts; but in the years after the war, a number of NVA high officials have repeatedly stated that had the Trail been successfully cut, the North could not have prosecuted its war against the South. The HCM Trail-cutting operation was Hanoi’s greatest fear. In 1965 General William Westmoreland first proposed the operation to cut the Trail across Route 9 to Thailand (the York Strategy). He proposed it again every year for the next three years, and every year it was blocked by US politicians. Mini-Tet and the battle for Kham Duc Special Forces camp (May 1968), are earlier point-counterpoints in this same strategic play. The strategy was finally approved under General Creighton Abrams when the ARVN was allowed to make the attempt in 1971.]

Other revelations: Ripcord, from it’s opening, “…had a major impact on the enemy… disrupted the orderly flow of supplies and reinforcements down the Ho Chi Minh Trail… [it’s] artillery firing into the Trail complex, the Air Force had placed a Directional Beacon on Ripcord, and the Navy and Marines had installed a Tactical Aircraft Antenna for ‘beacon bombing’ in the A Shau Valley, the Warehouse Area…” (pg 66)

The success of the US/ARVN counter-offensives at Tet and mini-Tet 1968 caused Hanoi to revert its war strategy back to the ‘protracted struggle’ (guerilla warfare stage) in most of South Viet Nam. But by early 1970 the NVA had re-manned and refitted units in northern I Corps to the point of waging division-sized, conventional offensive campaigns. Harrison delineates all enemy units involved in these battles.

“’…the number of Chinese in  North Vietnam in 1967… between 60,000 and 100,000…  In all, China sent 327,000 uniformed troops…’ Chinese historian Chen Jian wrote, ‘Although Beijing’s support many have fallen short of Hanoi’s expectations, without this support, the history, even the outcome, of the Vietnam War might have been different.’”  And: “’…at the height of the War, the Soviet Union had some 55,000 ‘Advisors’ in North Vietnam…’  According to classified reports from the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, their aid amounted to over $582 million US dollars in 1968….’” (pg  186-7)

On meaning and tactical/strategic success (much of this is lacking in earlier Ripcord books):  “…the price the North Vietnamese paid during the siege of Ripcord from at least eight infantry battalions, four artillery battalions, four 120mm mortar companies, one anti-aircraft battalion, one sapper battalion (reinforced)… was a minimum of 2400 killed and several thousand more wounded…” “…Ripcord stands as a monument of success… a very major contributor to the [NVA’s] second offensive of the war (the Nguyen Hue or Easter Offensive) being delayed until March 1972… Without the success of Ripcord, that offensive would have been advanced a full year…” (pg 216)

If one had any criticism of Hill Top it might be that much of the work is a compilation of PAVN and US/ARVN documents presented verbatim. This is a wonderful and authoritative history, but, at times, difficult reading. Hill Top is best when Harrison uses his own voice to describe and/or explain actions. That being noted, I personal would like to thank Ben Harrison for enlightening—for casting light upon, and bringing meaning to—the battles of Texas Star.

John M. Del Vecchio

del_vecchio74@yahoo.com

Hell on a Hill Top:  America’s Last Major Battle in Vietnam. 

Major General Benjamin L. Harrison, iUniverse, Inc., Lincoln, Nebraska.  2004.

            Considering all that has been written about the Vietnam War in the last thirty years it would seem that the subject has been covered completely.  Not so.  Benjamin Harrison’s Hell on a Hill Top breaks new ground—and does it in an unusual way.

            Fought from March to July 1970, the Battle for Firebase “Ripcord” was the war’s last big clash between U.S. and North Vietnamese troops.  But until now it has been essentially forgotten.

            Overshadowed by the incursion into Cambodia that May, and coming in the midst of the withdrawal of U.S. combat units from Vietnam, the combat raging around “Ripcord” fell into the cracks of history.  Harrison’s book rescues the battle from obscurity, restoring it to its rightful place in the storied annals of the 101^st Airborne Division.

            Elements of the division’s 3^rd Brigade, which then-Colonel Harrison commanded, precipitated the long slugfest.  Americans carved out positions on key terrain near the A Shau Valley, endangering the all-important North Vietnamese supply lines into the south.  Enemy commanders could not tolerate that threat to their operational freedom of action.  They reacted violently, igniting months of bitter fighting.

            Ben Harrison tells the story of the prolonged struggle in clear, crisp prose, giving full credit to the heroism of the men and the professionalism of the units engaged there.  If that had been all he accomplished with this book, he would have made a most valuable addition to the history of the Vietnam War.  But he did much more. 

Hell on a Hill Top is a rarity among battle studies—it paints a vivid combat scene from the perspective of both antagonists.  Harrison conducted extensive research into the enemy side, to include personally interviewing North Vietnamese veterans of the fierce encounter.  Thus, the reader enjoys a multi-dimensional appreciation of the action.  (As an aside, how Harrison managed to get the other side of the story is itself a fascinating tale of perseverance, intrigue, and human nature.  Especially gripping is the account of his meeting in 2004 at a remote site in Vietnam with his opposite number.)

            For a ripping good read, don’t miss this riveting account of the fight for “Ripcord.”

                                                Dave R. Palmer

                                                Lieutenant General (retired), U S Army

                                                Author of Summons of the Trumpet

RIPCORD REVISITED   ( Hell On A Hill Top)

A book review by

Sidney B. Berry, Lieutenant General, U.S.Army, Retired

By reporting the North Vietnamese side of the March-July 1970 battle for Fire Support Base Ripcord plus his own perspective as responsible brigade commander, Major General Ben Harrison's HELL ON A HILL TOP, America's Last  Major Battle in Vietnam, published in 2004,  adds welcome dimension to Keith Nolan's RIPCORD, published in 2000.  Taken together, these two superb books record the battle for the jungled mountain called Ripcord and  illuminate the courage and tenacity of the soldiers that fought on opposing sides of the hill.  Harrison's distinguished career as Army Aviator enables him to highlight with rare understanding the vital role of Army Aviation and Aviation Crews during the Ripcord campaign.

The two book's sub-titles are illuminating.   Nolan's  book, based primarily on American sources, highlights Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970.  Harrison's book, incorporating previously unavailable Communist Vietnamese sources, highlights The 324B Division Surrounds the 101^st Airborne's Currahee Battalion.    

Both authors bring special credentials to their research and writing.  Nolan is a noted chronicler of the Vietnam War at the tactical level and author of a dozen books about that war. 

Harrison commanded the Screaming Eagles 3^rd Brigade during the final month of the battle for Fire Support Base Ripcord and planned and directed the American withdrawal from the base on 23 July 1970.  As true for every participant in the March-July 1970 battle for Ripcord, Harrison can never forget the soul-searing events of those days, the courage of the soldiers, the human tragedy involved, and the pain of withdrawal under enemy pressure.  Afterwards, Ben Harrison has devoted himself to learning more about the circumstances of the battle and to honoring those who fought, bled, and died in the battle for Ripcord.

Knowing that full understanding of the Ripcord battle's significance required knowledge of the enemy's perspective, Harrison determined to learn what the opposing Communist North Vietnamese commander knew, thought, and intended during March-July 1970.   He researched US records, interviewed Ripcord veterans and other knowledgeable officials, and gained access to a number of Communist North Vietnamese records.  Most importantly, Harrison visited Vietnam in 2001 and 2004, where he interviewed North Vietnamese commanders who fought to seize Fire Support Base Ripcord and failed.

What Harrison learned provides  remarkable insight into the enemy's strategy and tactics during their March-July 1970 campaign to destroy the Americans operating on and around Fire Support Base Ripcord, the mountain peak that towered 927 meters above the surrounding jungle and stood eye-to-eye with nearby enemy-held mountains.  Harrison's findings illuminate the magnificence of the performance of duty of the young American soldiers who fought the Ripcord campaign and the dogged determination of the opposing enemy soldiers .

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For the Screaming Eagles, the last full American division in Viet Nam, operating from  Fire Support Base Ripcord was essential to defending South Vietnam's heavily-populated coastal region against Communist seizure and a base from which to launch a projected attack into the A Shau Valley alongside Laos to interrupt the Communist Ho Chi Minh Trail.

For the Communist North Vietnamese, eliminating American control of Ripcord was essential to defending their main supply route to Communist forces in South Vietnam, the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail that passed through the nearby A Shau Valley and to extending their drive to seize control of the South Vietnamese coastal area and its population. 

Seizure of Ripcord was so critical to North Vietnam's strategy for seizing all of South Vietnam that the Communist High Command assigned its 324B Division sole mission of seizing Ripcord and destroying its garrison.  The command reinforced the 324B Division with a fourth regiment and a sapper battalion and assigned its 304B Division in a supporting role.  Although fighting for Ripcord commenced in March 1970, it was on 1 July 1970 that North Vietnamese 324B Division launched its final attack to destroy American units operating in the jungle around Ripcord and to seize the base itself.

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On 23 June 1970 Colonel Ben Harrison assumed command of the 3^rd Brigade, 101^st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the brigade in whose area of operations Ripcord was located.

On 1 July 1970, the day that the 324B Division began its attack to seize Ripcord, Brigadier General Sid Berry joined the Screaming Eagles as Assistant Division Commander (Operations). 

             On 15 July 1970 Major General John Hennessey, the Division Commander, departed for a well-earned three week leave and left Brigadier General Berry in command of the 101^st Airborne Division.

Both Berry and Harrison were veterans of previous tours of duty in Vietnam.  Berry had spent a year as senior advisor to commanding general of a Vietnamese infantry division and eight months commanding a brigade in the US 1^st Infantry Division, the Big Red One. Harrison had spent a year commanding an aviation battalion that often supported the US 1^st Infantry Division.  Although both officers were native Mississippians, they had never met.  Neither Berry nor Harrison foresaw coming events.

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According to official North Vietnamese military records acquired by Harrison: At exactly 6:00 AM on 1 July [1970] the 324B Division Command Post issued the "open fire" order to all sectors...More than 70 American troops were killed in our attack by fire. [In fact, no Americans were killed on Ripcord on 1 July, although 15 artillerymen received minor wounds while delivering counter battery fire.] Thus began the final battle for Ripcord that ended with the Screaming Eagle withdrawal twenty-two days later.

Harrison's interviews of opposing commanders and analysis of official records on both sides in the Ripcord battle, buttressed by  his personal knowledge, reveal that: (1) the Communist North Vietnamese were determined to take Ripcord regardless of the cost in human life; (2) attacking Communist strength was greater than our intelligence reported or than we realized at the time of battle; (3) our Infantry units fighting in the mountains around Ripcord and their supporting firepower provided by artillery, armed helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and virtually destroyed eight of nine enemy battalions.

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July 1970 proceeded with painful slowness.  As battle intensified, Infantry fighting around Ripcord and enemy bombardment of the base itself wrought a growing number of American casualties.  Serious questions arose in the mind of the 101^st Airborne Division's Acting Commander.  Is holding Ripcord essential?  If so, for what purpose?  For how long?  When does the human cost of holding Ripcord become unbearable?  If we decide to withdraw, how?

18 July was beginning of the end.  At about 1:30 PM a North Vietnamese12.7mm machine gun shot down a CH-47 helicopter carrying a sling load of ammunition to resupply the 105mm artillery battery atop Ripcord.  The aircraft crashed directly onto the ammo bunker and spilled burning JP-4 aviation fuel down into the ammo dump, setting off over 400 rounds of artillery ammunition.  It was as if an active volcano had exploded or that Hell had blown its top. The fire and explosions continued for more than eight hours and rendered six tubes of 105mm artillery destroyed or unusable; their firepower was irreplaceable.  One aircraft crew member died, and four more were wounded in the helicopter crash.

Events of 21 July hastened Screaming Eagle decision-making.  Company D, 1^st Battalion, 506^th Infantry got into serious trouble, and Company D, 2^nd Battalion, 506^th Infantry went to its rescue.  A heavy salvo of 82mm mortar rounds fell on the 155mm artillery atop Ripcord wounding seven and killing two artillerymen, including the acting battery commander.  That afternoon Company A, 2^nd Battalion, 506^th Infantry tapped into an enemy telephone line and discovered that an enemy division had four regiments surrounding Ripcord on the north, south, east, and west.  This new information confirmed the acting division commander's growing instinct that it was time to withdraw from Ripcord.

Early 22 July BG Berry informed Colonel Harrison that we would withdraw from Ripcord on the next day, and together they commenced the necessary planning for the dangerous operation.  During that night, Company A, 2/506th Infantry fought for its life.

The 23 July 1970 withdrawal from Ripcord and extraction from the bush of hard-pressed Company A, 2/506th Infantry was entirely by helicopter--eloquent testimony to the effectiveness of Army Aviation and to the dedication, skill, and courage of Army Aviators and their crews.  The withdrawal prolonged the lives and limbs of countless American and North Vietnamese soldiers who would have been wounded, maimed, and killed had the battle for Ripcord continued.

In May 2004 Ben Harrison asked the former commander of 324B Division, What would you have done if we had not evacuated Firebase Ripcord? I still had one [of nine] battalion left, replied General Doi.  Both sides paid a heavy price for Ripcord.

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Ben Harrison's HELL ON A HILL TOP rounds off our understanding of the battle for Ripcord during March-July 1970, America's Last Major Battle in Vietnam.  The author's drive, determination, and tenacity in acquiring access to Communist North Vietnamese records and in gaining interviews with opposing commanders are the same qualities that made him an effective brigade commander during the last stage of the battle for Ripcord.  Most of all, Harrison's dedication to telling the full story of Ripcord reflects his rare understanding of and enduring love for the soldiers he commanded and with whom he will serve as long as he lives.

A review by Col (Ret) Lewis Sorley,

Distinguished history professor and honored author:

"This authentic first-hand account of 1970 battles in the A Shau provides valuable insight into the difficult tasks facing those American forces then remaining in Vietnam as the unilateral U.S. withdrawal inexorably proceeded. The author's persistence and diligence in overcoming many obstacles to develop some of the enemy perspective on this encounter provides another useful dimension."

Lewis Sorley, Author of "A Better War"

Professor Sorley also said: 

"Your technique of alternating what the enemy side had to say with data from U.S. sources and your own commentary was very effective.

"The included accounts from several helicopter crewmen were among the most arresting I have read."

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